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The Development of the Issue of Same-Sex
Couples Under Israeli Law
Yitshak Cohen*
ABSTRACT
The State of Israel determined by legislation that matters of personal
status including marriage and divorce are subject to personal law, namely
religious law. Since the applicable law is personal and not territorial, it var-
ies from person to person and is not uniform as under civil law. This simply
means that Israel has no separation of religion and state in matters of di-
vorce and marriage. Religion is the only determining factor in these mat-
ters. Thus, marriages prohibited by religious law do not take place in Israel.
This is true for all four major religions in Israel: Christianity, Islam, the
Druze religion, and Judaism. The discussion of same-sex couples under Is-
raeli law should have ended here: marriage and even sexual relations be-
tween same-sex partners are prohibited by the four religions in IsraeL
Therefore, they have no place in a state in which religious law prevails in
matters ofstatus.
However, the Israeli courts have more ofa civil orientation than a reli-
gious one and look for ways to bridge the gap between religious law and real-
ity as they understand it. In some cases, they have recognized the status of
same-sex couples. The change started by providing material economic rights,
such as the right to a benefit given to an employee's spouse by an employer,
mutual inheritance rights, and more. The courts did not stop there but con-
tinued granting rights both on the public level and in matters of legal status.
For example, same-sex couples can now be registered as a married couple in
the Registry Office if they were married overseas, and they can adopt chil-
dren just as heterosexual couples can. Some argue that today there is no
longer any meaning to the law which states that marriage shall be deter-
mined only by the personal religious law of each individual. The decisions
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made in these matters are sharply disputed and reflect the constant prevail-
ing tensions regarding Israel not only as a Jewish state but also as a demo-
cratic state. Although the Basic Laws stipulate that Israel is both, in practice
these values conflict and often collide. This tension is clearly reflected in and
may be analyzed through the issue of'same-sex couples.
I. INTRODUCTION
When the State of Israel was established in 1948, it decided to
adopt some of the legislation enacted by the British government,
which had ruled the country prior to its independence. One such ex-
ample is the King's Order in Council, 1922-1947. Article 51 of this
law states, "Matters of personal status mean: lawsuits concerning
marriage or divorce, alimony, maintenance, or guardianship.. .. "'
Article 47 sets forth, "Jurisdiction in matters of personal status . . .
will be according to applicable personal law." 2 This Order in Council
has not been cancelled.
The law in matters of personal status is personal law that varies
with the individual. Personal status law is not territorial, and is not
the same for everyone in Israel. It was also determined that the appli-
cable personal law would be in accordance with the religion of the lit-
igant, not in accordance with his citizenship nor his residency.' Thus
the law of the church applies to Christians;4 Jewish law is the applica-
ble law for Jews; the Sharia law applies to Muslims; and the Druze re-
ligious law is applicable for the Druze people. These are the four ma-
jor religions in Israel, and the only religions that are legally
recognized.
Five years after Israel's establishment, Section 2 of the Rabbinical
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, enacted in 1953, set
forth more explicitly: "Marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel will take
place according to Jewish religious law."' This means that Israel has
1. Article 51 of the 1922 King's Order-in-Council III Laws of Palestine, 2569.
2. Article 47 of the 1922 King's Order-in-Council III Laws of Palestine, 2580.
3. CA 26/51 Kotik v. Wallfson 5 PD 1341 (1951) (Isr.).
4. Regarding the different Christian communities in Israel, see the following Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. There are approximately ten Christian denominations that
as "recognized" communities are granted jurisdiction in matters of personal status: Yishai Eldar,
Focus on Israel: The Christian Communities of Israel, ISRAEL MINIsTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(May 1, 2014), http://www.mfa.gov.ilinfalaboutisrael/people/pages/focus%20on%20israel%
20-%20 the%20christian%20communities%20of%20isr.aspx (last visited Feb. 29th, 2016).
5. Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953, § 2, 165
LSI 72 (1953) (Isr.).
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no separation of religion and state in matters of personal status. The
entities responsible for marriages are the religious institutions them-
selves. Spouses belonging to the same religion are subject to its exclu-
sive authority, both in their marriage or in their divorce.6 Marriage
prohibited by religion cannot take place in Israel. For example, a
non-Jew cannot marry a Jew. Accordingly, a man or woman may not
marry someone of the same sex because it is not permissible under all
four legally recognized religions in Israel.
Ostensibly, the discussion of same-sex marriage in Israel should
have stopped here. In contrast, in the United States where there is a
separation of church and state, rulings and decisions can be deter-
mined by the civil courts rather than by religion. However in Israel,
where the applicable law is personal religious law, same-sex couples
should not be recognized as married. Surprisingly, and inconsistent
with personal religious law, the courts have allowed their civil per-
spective to shape their decisions to recognize more legal protections
for same-sex couples.
Concurrent with the authority given to religions over the institu-
tion of marriage and the prohibition of marriage between certain in-
dividuals, the Israeli courts, in contrast to the legislature, began de-
veloping alternatives to religiously-sanctioned marriage. Among
these alternatives are private marriage, 7 civil marriage,' and common
law marriage.' Of course, nobody referred to them as such, and they
became amalgamated under the umbrella term "marriage." Every-
thing was done under the cloak of specific solutions to the plight of
privacy and humanity. However, these specific solutions have created
in Israel an entire area of civil law, which in certain respects is even
more developed than in countries in which civil law applies. This ar-
ticle analyzes the development of this civil law with regard to same-
sex couples.
6. See Id. at § 1 ("Matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel, being nationals or
residents of the Sate, shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical courts.").
https://www.knesset.gov.il/review/ReviewPage2.aspx?kns=2&lng=3
7. See, e.g., HCJ 51/69 Rodnizki v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court 24(1) PD 704
(1969) (Isr.); HCJ 80/63 Gorfinkel v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court 17 PD 2048 (1963) (Isr.).
8. See, e.g., CA8256/99Anonynousv. Anonymous 58(2) PD 213 (2003) (Isr.) (regulat-
ing the civil support between spouses married abroad in a civil ceremony); see also HCJ 2232/03
Anonymous v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court (Nov. 21, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by sub-
scription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (regularizing the status of spouses who were married abroad in a
civil ceremony and states that they are married under the laws of Noah).
9. See, e.g., CA 52/80 Sha'ar v. Friedman 38(1) PD 443 (1980) (Isr.); CA 4385/91 Sa-
lem v. Carmi 5 1(1) PD 337 (1991) (Isr.).
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Another way that same-sex couples have found recognition in Is-
rael is through the Population Registry. People who are not allowed
or do not want to get married according to religious law may choose
to marry abroad. Upon returning to Israel, they are registered in the
Population Registry as married.'o How is this registration consistent
with a law stating that only religious law determines marriage? Arti-
cle 3 of the Population Registry Law, enacted in 1965, provides that,
"registration ... will be prima facie evidence of the correctness of
registration except for the details of nationality, religion, marital sta-
tus, and spouse's name."" Thus the registration of those details is ap-
parently meaningless. This is actually intended in order to avoid dis-
putes concerning ideology, fundamental principles, and religion.
In my opinion, just as the boundary between bravery and foolish-
ness is a fine line and clarity may sometimes only be achieved in ret-
rospect, the line between naivet6 and genius is also very fine. The Ar-
ticle 3 provision has helped Israeli law, or perhaps stated more
precisely the Israeli nation, to avoid possible ideological arguments in
relation to the registration of marriages forbidden by religion, such as
a marriage between a Jew and a non-Jew. 2 The argument is that the
registration does not in any case provide prima facie evidence of its
accuracy. 3 However, the provision of law' 4 also resulted in the regis-
tration of certain matters the legislature surely did not intend."
II. THE INITIAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES
The legislature has taken some action in regards to same-sex
10. See Population Registry Law, 5725-1965, § 17, 270 LSI 85 (1965) (Isr.) (states that
every resident must register any changes in status within thirty days.).
11. Id. at § 3.
12. HCJ 143/62 Schlesinger v. The Minister of the Interior 17 PD 225 (1963) (Isr.).
13. Id. at 249.
14. Population Registry Law, 5725-1965, § 3, 270 LSI 85 (1965) (Isr.).
15. See, e.g., HCJ 264/87 Shas Movement v. Director of the Population Administration
43(2) PD 723 (1987) (Isr.) (It was determined that the registration clerk has to register the con-
version of a person on the basis of a document attesting to conversion by a Jewish community
outside of Israel. That ruling applies even if the clerk believes that the conversion process is not
valid according to religious law in Israel.). See also HCJ 2888/92 Goldstein v. The Minister of
the Interior 50(5) PD 89 (1987) (Isr.) (The Supreme Court ordered the registration of a mar-
riage held at the Brazilian Embassy in Israel, despite the fact that foreign ambassadors lack the
authority to conduct marriage ceremonies in Israel). HCJ 5070/95 Na'amat v. The Minister of
the Interior 56(2) PD 721 (1995) (Isr.) (The Supreme Court ordered the registration of indi-
viduals who underwent a Reform conversion in Israel or in Jewish communities outside of Isra-
el, even though Reform conversions performed in Israel are not valid).
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couples. The very few amendments made to Israeli law neither rec-
ognized same-sex couples nor granted them rights, but only tried to
prevent injury or penalty. Three amendments were made to Israeli
statutory provisions: in 1988, the legislature abolished the criminal
prohibition against homosexual relationships;" in 1992, the legisla-
ture banned employment discrimination at work on grounds of sexual
orientation;" and in 1993, the Army Ordinances were amended to
prohibit discrimination due to sexual orientation."
A. EL AL v. Danilovich - Airplane Ticket
With regard to changes in case law, the groundbreaking decision
concerning same-sex couples in Israel is undoubtedly EL AL v. Dani-
lovich.` According to a flight attendant's employment agreement, the
employee was entitled to airplane tickets for himself and for "his / her
spouse (husband / wife)," including "the common law husband / wife
of an employee." The flight attendant requested the benefit for an
individual who was his same-sex spouse during the previous ten years.
The employer EL AL refused.20 The court ruled that a provision that
confers a benefit on common law spouses but does not provide for
same-sex spouses is discriminatory in light of the Equal Opportuni-
ties Act of 1988.
Justice Barak, in the majority opinion that denied the petition of
EL AL also wrote:
Equality is a fundamental value in Israeli law. Today the principle
of equality is established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty.21 The test for equal or discriminatory treatment is a ques-
tion of whether the difference in sex is relevant. The aim is to pro-
vide a benefit to the employee for the person with whom he lives
16. Penal Law, 5748-1988, § 2, 1246 LSI 62 (1992), as amended (no.22) (Isr.).
17. Equal Employment Opportunities Law, 5752-1992, § 2, 1377 LSI 37 (1992), as
amended (Isr.).
18. The Army Ordinances, 1993.
19. HCJ 721/94 EL AL v. Danilovich 48(5) PD 749 (1994) (Isr.).
20. Id. at § 5 (the request was refused, without detailed explanation. In the Petition to
the High Court of Justice, El Al responded that its refusal to provide the Respondent with a
flight ticket for his life partner is not illegal discrimination under the Equal Employment Op-
portunities Law. This law prohibited an additional kind of discrimination ("sexual orienta-
tion"), but did not grant rights to receive benefits to which an employee was previously not en-
titled.).
21. The State of Israel has no comprehensive constitution but from time to time enacts
Basic Laws, which have higher normative status than ordinary law.
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and from whom he separates when the employee goes out on his
flights. The purpose of the benefit is not to strengthen the institu-
tion of marriage, and not to encourage traditional family life. The
denial of this benefit from a same-sex spouse is irrelevant and there-
fore constitutes discrimination and violation of equality.22
Justice Kedmi wrote in the minority opinion:
The linguistic concept of a spouse together with whom one forms a
'family'-reflects, in the social sphere, a joining of two individuals
of different sexes as a 'couple'. 'Spouse' has since the beginning of
humankind and until this day-indicated the union of two individu-
als of opposite sexes. So, too, as stated in the Bible, "And God cre-
ated man . . . male and female he created them." 3 An essential ele-
ment for two individuals becoming a 'pair,' according to the
meaning of the Hebrew word, is in their ability-conceptually-to
'reproduce.' No same-sex relationship is the same unit that under-
lies the organizational structure of human society; When society
reaches the conclusion that a same-sex couple deserves to be a basic
unit of social structure, then the conceptual linguistic meaning of
the words 'couple' and 'family' will change.24
In light of linguistic reasons and reasons of societal structure, the
dissenting judge decided that the EL AL employment agreement did
not apply to a same-sex couple.
The ruling in EL AL avoided the principle discussion. Justice
Barak limited the rationale to regard an employee's social rights and
nothing more. However, he provided an open door for his successors.
Lower courts were divided on the issue. Some tried to fend off any
attempt to recognize same-sex spouses. Others followed the EL AL
path and recognized same-sex couples. In the next two sections, I will
analyze four decisions, two reflecting each approach
III. FAMILY COURTS AGAINST RIGHTS FOR SAME-SEX
COUPLES
A. FA 8/94 Steiner - Survivor's Pension
Same-sex partners lived together for eight years. One partner was
killed. The deceased was a military man who was killed in action. The
22. HCJ 721/94 EL AL at 783.
23. Genesis 1:26.
24. HCJ 721/94 EL AL at 770.
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spouse of the deceased wished the partners to be recognized as a cou-
ple and to be given the rights granted to couples by law, such as the
survivor's pension.25 Magistrates' Court Justice German opened the
discussion with the aspect of interpretation by quoting the relevant
law. Section 1 of the Fallen Soldiers' Families Law, 1950, sets forth:
"A family member of a soldier killed in action means--one who was
the wife of the fallen soldier when he died, including a woman who
lived with him before his death and on the day of his death was his
common law wife." 2 6
The court said that one should not talk about "family" without
the elements of male, female, and parenting potential. Two people of
the same sex do not establish a family and are not a potential family.
It is hard to include a same-sex partner in the term "family member,"
and in the more specific words "wife" and "husband." Therefore, the
court ruled that the law does not apply to same-sex couples.
In the opinion of the court, the lawful recognition of a common
law spouse as the husband or wife of an individual who passed away
does not contradict the basic family unit, even though the spouses
were not married, because a man and a woman can raise a family
(They can have children.). In contrast, same-sex spouses cannot have
children together and, therefore, cannot conceptually start a family.
The court's decision does not deal only with the formal linguistic
analysis, but also addresses the issue on a substantive level: "The Sol-
diers' Families Act gives rights to a small group of family members
related to the fallen soldiers. It narrows the circle only to family
members, even if others were more closely connected to the fallen
soldiers than were the actual family members."2 7
The court decision also deals with the principle of separation of
powers. The court notes that a prior bill to amend the law had pro-
posed including same-sex couples within the definition of spouses:
"or anyone who was a (male) common law spouse and was living with
him at that time-as long as they did not marry."" The proposed
amendment was rejected.29 The court left the legislative right to the
legislature for whom it was solely designed.
25. FA (TA) 8/94 Steiner v. Compensation Officer, Israel Defense Forces, (Aug. 13,
1995), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
26. The Fallen Soldiers' Families Law, 5710-1950, § 1, 52 LSI 162 (1950) (Isr.).
27. FA (TA), 8/94 Steiner at § 4.a.L.
28. Proposed Law: The Fallen Soldiers' Families Law, (Amendment - Definition of
Family Member), 5754-1994, § 1, LSI (1994) (Isr.).
29. FA 8/94 Steiner at § 4.1.
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The court's decision also addresses the issue on a social level. Ac-
cording to the court, homosexual relationships do not create a family
connection. There is no wisdom and no advice that goes against the
law of nature.3 0 The court also refers to how people behave. It states
that they do not view and do not relate to the male couple as a family.
The court's decision also addresses the aspect of the Basic Laws
of Israel. Judge German refers to a fundamental discussion between
Chief Justice Aharon Barak and Deputy Chief Justice Menachem
Elon. Section 1(a) of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
states that "[t]he purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human digni-
ty and liberty in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of Israel
as a Jewish and democratic state.""
Chief Justice Barak wrote with reference to the Basic Law:
The language of the Basic Law refers to two resources of values that
the State of Israel draws upon: Judaism and democracy. In order to
avoid a possible conflict between them we have to raise the value of
Judaism to a high level of abstraction, so that these values will be
drawn upon only on their universal abstract level. 32
Elsewhere, Chief Justice Barak stated a more moderate position
balancing the values of Judaism with those of democracy and wrote:
Israel's values as a Jewish state might conflict with its values as a
democratic state. The criterion of the 'enlightened public' will serve
as a guide. 33 The 'enlightened community' and the 'reasonable per-
son' are only metaphors ... they are a personification of the proper
balance among the values, the principles and the competing inter-
ests. 34
Justice Elon criticizes this approach:
Since we achieved the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty, it is inappropriate to introduce an element such as
'views of the enlightened public in Israel.' This Basic Law includes
values that have been extensively interpreted as well as worldviews,
30. Id. at § 5.b.2.
31. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, § 1, 1391 LSI 150, (1992)
(Isr.).
32. Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Fundamental Rights, 1 L. &
Gov'T L. REv. 9, 30 (1992).
33. The "enlightened public" means an objective test of the reasonable public. The test
for acceptance of a norm is whether the enlightened public in Israel accepts it. This is an open
nonn that can be given broad interpretation so that the implementation of the test is problem-
atic.
34. HCJ 7074/93 Suissa v. Attorney-General 48(2) PD 749, 781 (1994) (Isr.).
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so that a vague concept such as 'enlightened' will add uncertainty.
The views of the 'enlightened public' do not determine the scope,
content and nature of the supreme value of 'human dignity.' 35
The position of Chief Justice Barak reflects an approach that
tends to place the values of democracy over the values of Judaism.
Deputy Chief Justice Elon fought for many years against these per-
ceptions. Family Court Justice German holds the opinion of the dep-
uty. To strengthen his position, he quotes Professor Procaccia:
A fundamental value of the people and the state cannot be changed.
It also cannot be dependent on the opinion of others, even if the
others are enlightened nations. It is important that the legal system
be able to develop and to invent suitable answers to a changing so-
ciety. But that includes a danger, that the change will not always be
in the direction of progress and increased protection of human
rights, because sometimes society is in a state of ideological regres-
sion. As long as these moral values remain in people's hearts, they
will prevent the deterioration of society and the legal system.36
Judge German adds to this discussion and says that prohibitions
against incestuous relationships also include sexual relations between
men." According to Jewish law, it is one of the three prohibitions
commanding that one should die rather than transgress. Homosexu-
ality and Judaism are incompatible." These relationships contradict
the values of the country "as a Jewish state," and therefore, they
should not be recognized as relationships that establish a family.
Non-recognition of a spouse in this case does not contradict the val-
ues of Israel as a democratic state, as it does not violate an individual's
right to live his personal life with his sexual orientation as he choos-
es.39 Therefore the court denied the request.
B. Family Court 16610/04 -A Financial Agreement
In this spirit of resistance, the following judgment was given.' A
35. CA 506/88 Sheferv. State of Israel 48(1) PD 87, 103 (1988) (Isr.).
36. Uriel Procaccia, Reflections on Charges ofFundamental Values in Law, 15 TEL Aviv U.
L. REv. 377, 378 (1990).
37. Leviticus 18:22.
38. FA (TA) 8/94 Steiner v. Compensation Officer, Israel Defense Forces, (Aug. 13,
1995), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
39. Id.
40. File No. 016610/04 Family Court, Anonymous v. Attorney-General (May. 8, 2005),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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request was submitted to grant a financial agreement between same-
sex spouses the validity of a judgment. Article 1(2) of the Family
Court Law of 1995 defines a man's "family member" as "his spouse,
including a common-law wife.""
Family Court Justice Gaifman set forth the legislative history.
The issue of same-sex couples was part of the discussion that took
place in the Knesset (Israel's legislative body) before the enactment of
the law. When the law was drafted, the phrase "common-law wife"
was intentionally inserted to prevent a same-sex spouse from being
included as "his family member."4 2 In 2003, a bill was submitted to
amend "a family member" to "same-sex partner." The proposal was
defeated by a vote of 34 to 12. The government explained, "Any
change in the status quo in matters of religion and state will be made
with the agreement of all the coalition members, and there is no
agreement." 43 Justice Gaifman summarized his conclusions and sug-
gested that this issue be left to the legislature. The request brought
before the court in this case was denied.
My analysis of these judgments that oppose granting rights to
same-sex couples shows five basic reasons for objection:
1. Linguistic-biological: The phrase "man and wife" and the term
"family members" can include only couples that potentially could
have children, and this is the desirable structure for a family unit.
2. Social: Same-sex relationships are not socially acceptable.
3. Separation of powers among the branches of government: It is
the work of the legislature, not the courts, to create new concepts in
the law.
4. Religious: The basic values of the state reject recognition of a
matter that conflicts with a Jewish value.
5. Precedents: The objection is based on previous rulings that did
not recognize the rights of same-sex couples.
IV. FAMILY COURT RECOGNITION OF A SAME-SEX COUPLE
Surprisingly, other courts have recognized same-sex couples us-
ing the same rationales. I will list only two major examples.
186
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42. File No. 016610/04 Family Court, Anonymous at § 5.
43. Id. at § 7.
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A. CA 3245/03, A.M. - Inheritance
In A.M., two men had been living as a couple for approximately
forty years. 4 The question under discussion was whether they would
inherit from each other. Article 55 of the Law of Succession, 1965
states: "When a man and a woman were living a family life in a joint
household, and one of them died ... the survivor inherits the de-
ceased as if they were married to each other." 5
The minority opinion argued that this section is intended to pro-
vide a response for a man and a woman who are not married. The
Knesset Protocols publication indicates that the phrase "man and
woman" has only one interpretation.46 The subjective desire of the
legislature was to provide a response for couples that still have the
potential to marry according to their personal law.
The majority opinion agreed that the purpose of Section 55 was
to provide common law spouses with the inheritance rights granted
to married couples.4 7 However, common law couples who are unable
to marry under Jewish law are the individuals primarily assisted by
Article 55." The majority opinion argued further that the rights of
common law spouses have also been expanded in other areas. It indi-
cated that today's normative regime increasingly recognizes freedom
of human sexual orientation. 49 This recognition is due to the com-
bined influence of statutory amendments to Israeli legislation. Thus
the interpreter is also required to examine the text according to the
purpose of the law."o
According to the majority opinion, the theory of interpretation
should not focus on the meaning of the text as originally enacted by
the legislature. Nearly forty years after the enactment of the Law of
Succession, the interpreter must instead also focus his opinion on the
general changes in Israeli law, the new perceptions, and new inter-
pretations that were given to old expressions. If, as in the case of EL
AL, a same-sex spouse would be entitled to the rights granted to a
spouse of the opposite sex, then the determination that an individual
44. File No. 3245/03 Civil Appeals (Naz'), A.M. v. General Custodian (Nov. 11, 2004),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
45. Law of Succession, 5725-1965, § 63, 446 LSI 63 (1965) (Isr.).
46. Knesset Protocols, Vol. 42, p. 1012.
47. CA 3245/03 A.M. at § 4.
48. Id. at sect. 5.
49. Id. at sect. 8.
50. Id. at sect. 15.
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cannot inherit from a spouse of the same sex would lead to an unde-
sirable social outcome.s" It would also be harmful to public policy and
equality and would discriminate based on sexual orientation. In ac-
cordance with these arguments,5 2 the majority opinion decided that a
same-sex couple could inherit from each other.
Here one sees how the EL AL ruling affects the court's decision
to accept the couple's request and recognize a same-sex couple. This
shows that one cannot escape discussion of fundamental principles by
saying that the EL AL decision discussed only social rights. These so-
cial rights lead to full recognition of same-sex spouses. Subsequent
decisions were based on them, and created a new legal reality in Isra-
el.
B. Family C6960/03 Z. r M. - Financial Agreement
The second example of recognition deals with a financial agree-
ment for same-sex couples." Same-sex spouses had been together for
about 19 years. The couple reached an agreement with a woman to
marry one of them and bear their children. Twins were born and the
heterosexual married couple subsequently divorced. The agreement
between the same-sex couple included financial arrangements, raising
the children, and more.
The Family Court Justice Granit requested the position of the
state. The state argued that an agreement between common law
spouses, who are male and female, could be approved but an agree-
ment between same-sex spouses could not.14 The court rejected the
state's position for the following reasons:
1. The linguistic/interpretive aspect: Article 1(2) of the Family
Court Law of 1995 defines "his family member" as "his spouse, in-
cluding a common-law wife." The court argued that if the legislature
wanted to limit its authority only to heterosexual spouses, it had to
state in Article 1(2): "the (female) spouse, including a common-law
wife."" However, the wording of the law means that the "family" of a
man is a man. The court held that the judgment in the matter of suc-
cession, discussed earlier, puts an end to the state's position. If same-
51. Id.
52. Id. (Levy, J., concurring).
53. File No. 6960/03 Family Court, Z & M (Nov. 21, 2004), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
54. Id. at §§ 7-8.
55. Id. at § 12.
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sex spouses may inherit from each other, then they are entitled to
court approval of their agreement.s6
2. The substantive aspect: The state asserted that the legislature
did not think about creating a family composed of same-sex spouses.
It further argued that Israeli law did not recognize this as a legal and
social institution. Its creation involves the determination of questions
of social and moral values. The court responded that this was a state-
ment without any reasoning. Perhaps the legislature drafted the defi-
nitions in such a way that they apply-both linguistically and sub-
stantively-to all couples. The court argued that the state did not
sufficiently consider today's reality not only in Israel, but also
throughout the Western world."
3. The Basic Laws: The court stated that one can base the right
of same-sex couples to equality in Section 1 of the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty, which sets forth, "Fundamental human rights in
Israel .. . will be respected in the spirit of the principles in the Decla-
ration of the Establishment of the State of Israel."" As stated in the
declaration, the State of Israel "will ensure complete equality of social
and political rights for all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race
or sex." The court determined that discrimination against same-sex
couples arises solely from conservative ideology that is unwilling to
accept any substantive change in reality." This ideology demands
that reality adapt to law, instead of law adapting to reality. "o There-
fore, it was decided that same-sex spouses are relatives for the pur-
pose of the term "family member," and their agreement should be
approved.
In conclusion, in my view, the recognition of same-sex couples is
also actually based on the same five parameters that were used by the
opposing courts.
1. Linguistic/exegetical aspect: The interpreter is required to ex-
amine the text according to the purpose of the law.
2. Social aspect: A change in reality cannot be ignored.
3. Separation of political powers: The legislature left the matter
open by choosing ambiguous language.
56. Id. at§ 11-20.
57. Id. at§§521-24.
58. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, § 1, 1391 LSI 150 (1992) (Isr.).
59. File No. 6960/03 Family Court, Z & M (Nov. 21, 2004), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) at § 47.
60. Id.
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4. Morality/discrimination: In accordance with fundamental val-
ues, same-sex couples have a right to equality.
5. Precedents of previous judicial decisions.
Actually, the entire difference between the decisions is due to the
presiding judge and his personal worldview. Orthodox Jews gave the
first two decisions that did not grant rights to same-sex couples, while
non-religious Jews gave the last two decisions that granted rights to
same-sex marriage. This is really a consideration of the same circum-
stances and the same terms in the legislation, yet the judges reach
completely different conclusions. One is a supporter of social change,
and the other seeks to block it. More decisions have recognized same-
sex spouses than those that do not. In fact, very few judgments do not
recognize same-sex spouses. This could indicate that on the econom-
ic/financial level, even religious judges do not refrain from granting
social benefits to same-sex couples.
Every judge that granted rights to a same-sex couple has tried to
explain that he was not changing the world order, but resolving a
specific difficulty-the personal distress of individuals." However, in
practice these small modifications resulted in a significant change in
Israeli law. This change is contrary to what has been the legislature's
approach, as seen in its dismissal of every bill to change the law and
broaden the meaning of family member. However, the courts went
further than the legislature and brought about social change.62
V. THE PUBLIC ARENA
Thus far the discussion has dealt with economic and financial
rights such as approval of a financial agreement, inheritance, social
rights in the workplace, and more. The following section considers
the public arena that in some sense is more controversial and more of
a matter of principle. The analysis examines three leading cases.
61. See, e.g., HCJ 721/94 EL AL v. Danilovich 48(5) PD 749 (1994) (Isr.); File No.
3245/03 Civil Appeals (Naz'), A.M. v. General Custodian (Nov. 11, 2004), Nevo Legal Data-
base (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
62. In Israel, the courts interpret the law and can actually interpret it differently from
the way in which the legislature intended. The legislature can change the court's interpretation
through new legislation that will clarify its intent. The legislative process is long, and certainly
not as short as the process of judicial decision.
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A. HCJ 1779/99 Kaddish Brenner - Adoption
Two females who had been same-sex spouses for seven years were
citizens of Israel."3 They resided in the state of California in the
United States. One woman gave birth to a boy after sperm donation.
The other spouse adopted the child based on an adoption decree
granted in California. The two women requested to return to Israel
and sought to register the adoption in the Israel Population Registry.
In order to clarify the following discussion, I cite the Schlesinger
case with regard to a prohibited marriage:
It is not the duty of the registry clerk to give his opinion on the va-
lidity of the marriage. It is sufficient for the clerk if a document is
submitted showing that the resident underwent a marriage ceremo-
ny. The registry clerk may refuse registration only if the inaccuracy
of the document is obvious."
An example of a document that is obviously incorrect is a foreign
public document indicating that an adult is five years old.65 Certainly,
the registry clerk would not be instructed to register it in the registry.
In Kaddish Brenner, the registry clerk argued that the existence of two
same-sex parents is biologically impossible, and therefore, he could
not register them as such in the Population Registry. 6
Justice Dorner wrote in the majority opinion that the registration
does not reflect the biological aspect but the legal aspect. Therefore,
there was no obvious inaccuracy." Moreover, Private International
Law requires that an individual's personal status be recognized uni-
formly in all countries. 6' A different status in different countries vio-
lates public policy. Justice Dorner also noted that the registration
does not constitute prima facie evidence of its correctness, and there-
fore there is no concern about mistakes.69 Thus, she ordered the reg-
istry clerk to register the mother's spouse as the adoptive mother of
the child.
63. HCJ 1779/99 Brenner v. The Minister of the Interior 54(2) PD 368 (2000) (Isr.).
64. HCJ 143/62 Schlesinger v. The Minister of the Interior 17 PD 225, 252 (1963)
(Isr.).
65. HCJ 1779/99 Kadish Brenner 54(2) at 243.
66. Kaddish Brenner 54(2) PD 368 at 372.
67. Id. at 375.
68. See CA 191/51 Skornikv. Skornik 8 PD 141 (2000) (Isr.).
69. Dissenting Judge Zoa'bi insisted that this statement was incorrect as to the details
of the parents' names also constitute prima facie evidence of the correctness. See HCJ 1779/99
at 381 (Zoa'bi, J., dissenting).
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B. CA 10280/01 Yarus Hakak - Adoption.
Another case in the public arena with regard to fundamental
principles is Yarus Hakak.70 Same-sex female spouses sought to adopt
each other's children, who had been conceived by sperm donations.
Section 3 of the Adoption of Children Law of 1981 sets forth: "Adop-
tion is only by a man together with his wife."" Section 25 states, "If
the court finds that it would be in the best interests of the adopted
child, it may, under special circumstances, deviate from these re-
strictions ....
The District Court determined that same-sex couples do not
meet the conditions of the law and its purpose, because being an ex-
ceptional couple would further emphasize and highlight the excep-
tionality in the life of the child. An adoption decree granted to a
same-sex couple could result in a child having two mothers. Under
these unusual circumstances, the child would be regarded as different
from others. Furthermore, the granting of adoption decrees would
necessarily be construed as legal recognition, in principle, of the right
of same-sex couples to adopt children."
The women appealed to the Supreme Court. Justice Matza sug-
gested in the minority opinion that it is the work of the legislature to
establish an initial arrangement granting recognized legal status to
same-sex spouses. 4 Furthermore, a review of Knesset Protocols
shows that with the phrase "a man together with his wife" the legisla-
ture intended legally married spouses, while same-sex spouses cannot
get married." Justice Matza added that it was not proven that a
change in the personal status of a minor, from being the child of a
single mother to being the child of two mothers, would be in the best
interests of the child.76
Moreover, Justice Matza argued that granting adoption would be
taking a stand in principle regarding the status of same-sex couples
and the question of their right to adopt children. Among wide circles
of the population, the phenomenon of same-sex couples is seen as an
70. CA 10280/01 Yarus Hakak v. The Attorney General, 59(5) PD 64 (2005) (Isr.).
71. Adoption of Children Law, 5741-1981, § 3, 1028 LSI 293 (1981) (Isr.).
72. Id. at § 25.
73. FA 10/99 Anonymous v. The Attorney General, Israel Defense Forces, (May, 10,
2001), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
74. CA 10280/01 Hakak, 59(5) PD at §11 (MatzaJ., dissenting).
75. Id. at § 13.
76. Id. at § 15.
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uncommon exception to a customary social norm. Therefore, inter-
pretation that supports the adoption is inconsistent with the purpose
of the Adoption of Children Law. In contrast, the EL AL case dealt
with social rights, while here the court was asked to establish personal
status.n
However, the opinion of Justice Matza was rejected. Chief Justice
Barak wrote the majority opinion, asserting that one cannot say a pri-
ori that due to the same-sex spouses, adoption is not in the best inter-
est of the adopted child." Chief Justice Barak also referred to princi-
ples of interpretation of legislation. He explained that the legal
question is not (a) what the Knesset members thought when the law
was enacted; (b) what their abstract, subjective purpose was; or (c)
what were the interpretive perceptions of the Knesset members, how
they understood or interpreted a concept, or how they would solve
the current legal problem." Instead, the judge wanted to know the
legislative history in order to understand the purpose of the legisla-
tion. Chief Justice Barak further continues the arguments set forth in
his book, Judicial Discretion. He explains there that the legislature's
psychoanalysis is not of interest but rather the analysis of the law.80
According to these principles, Chief Justice Barak determined
that in demanding "special circumstances," the legislature sought to
relax the rigidity of the law in order to achieve the "best interests of
the adopted child." This is not a determination of status. This is a
consideration of personal factors as part of an individual determina-
tion as to the best interest of the adopted child. The court is not
making determinations with respect to institutions of law. It is deal-
ing with people in pain, live human beings, who appeared before it by
law." Justice Barak suggests that the time has come to amend the law
and instead of the "static" provisions that relate to "a man and his
wife" to determine "dynamic" provisions that deal with the material
circumstances justifying the granting of the right or obligation de-
termined by law."
At the end of his opinion, Chief Justice Barak criticized the mi-
nority position, which in principle ruled out the fitness of the moth-
77. Id. at§ 25.
78. Id. at§ 25.
79. See Al IARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (2003).
80. See Al lARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 289 (1987).
81. Id. at § 15.
82. Id. at § 40.
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ers to adopt children simply because they are same-sex spouses. Nev-
ertheless, the minority opinion ironically ruled that the matter should
be left to the legislature."
I think Justice Barak is mistaken. The minority opinion does not
require any legislative change because it already reflects the status
quo. On the contrary, Chief Justice Barak is the one who instead
changes the status quo with the majority opinion.
C. HJC 3045/05 Ben Ari - Registration
The most famous decision of the Supreme Court of Israel on this
issue, and the most recent one in the public arena is the Ben Ari
case." This case deals with five petitions of five same-sex male cou-
ples. Though the individual spouses were all Israeli citizens, they
were married in civil marriage ceremonies in Canada and subse-
quently requested to be registered as married couples in Israel's Pop-
ulation Registry. Their request was denied.
In order to understand the discussion in this matter, it is neces-
sary to refer to the Schlesinger case, where the court ruled that the
registry clerk is not authorized to determine the validity of the mar-
riage." Schlesinger also ruled that the registry clerk collects statistical
material as to whether or not a wedding ceremony took place. The
clerk may refuse to register only if there is an "obvious inaccuracy."8 6
Many judges and scholars have criticized the Schlesinger decision."
Some saw it as turning a blind eye." Justice Englard once wrote:
If it is only a matter of statistics that lack substantive meaning, why
are there continued struggles over registration? . . . The truth is, of
course, that the symbol here is of the essence, and without a certain
worldview there is no determination in the question of registration
in the Population Registry, and there are no statistics.8 9
The state's argument was that the phrase "married" in the regis-
83. Id. at § 31.
84. HCJ 3045/05 Ari v. Director of the Population Administration, (Nov. 21, 2006),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
85. HCJ 143/62 Schlesinger v. The Minister of the Interior 17 PD 225, 251 (1963)
(Isr.).
86. Id. at 243.
87. Menashe Shava, Registration and Recognition of a Foreign Adoption Order Within Lesbi-
an Family, I KIRYAT ONo L. REv. 103, 132 (2001).
88. HCJ 5070/95 Na'amat v. The Minister of the Interior 56(2) PD 764 (1995) (Isr.).
89. Id. at 757.
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try means marriages that are consistent with the basic legal template
under Israeli law regarding marriage. This format only referred to
marriage between a man and a woman. Justice Barak wrote the ma-
jority opinion rejecting the state's argument:
It is not appropriate that every time there is a change in the leader-
ship of the ministry in charge of population registration, there will
also be a change in policy. These questions deserve to be decided by
the people through their representatives in the Knesset. As long as
the Knesset has not spoken, it is fitting that these ethical decisions do
not fall within the scope of the Population Registry. 90
Justice Barak explained further that "obvious inaccuracy" referred
to in the Schlesinger case is factual inaccuracy." In contrast, the state
argued incorrectly that it referred to inaccuracy with respect to the
law.92 The court determined that the state was mistaken. Justice Bar-
ak added that it was neither a question of whether same-sex couples
can marry in a civil ceremony in Israel, nor a question of whether
they are married. These questions should be left to the legislature.
The only question that demands judgment is whether the registry
clerk must register the marriage. 93 Justice Barak gave an instruction
to register it. Five judges agreed with him.
I find it difficult to accept the position of Chief Justice Barak that
it is not the Minister who should determine the Ministry's policy. In
a properly functioning democratic system, the minister is chosen as
the representative of the people and is responsible for determining
policy. Indeed, the right to establish new policy exists every time a
new minister is elected. This is the essence of democracy and the es-
sence of the concept of the rule of the people. A judge may not say,
"The legislature is silent, so I will lead the change." The silence of
the legislature says something. It might say that there is no need to
change the law and that the current situation is desired.
Justice Rubinstein, who sat in the "religious justice seat, "94 argued
in the minority opinion that the Population Registry is not only a sta-
90. HCJ 3045/05 Ari v. Director of the Population Administration (Nov. 21, 2006),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) at section 14.
91. Id.a t 21.
92. Id.
93. Id. at § 22.
94. The State of Israel has a procedure which states that among fourteen Supreme
Court justices it is important to have at least one religious judge. This is not set forth in provi-
sions of law but determined in accordance with internal guidelines.
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tistical registry but also a social and public symbol." It is the "gate-
way" to Israeli legal reality."6 He explained that this court must give
its opinion, even regarding the question of how far it distances itself
from social consensus." Justice Rubinstein cites passages from two
books written by Professor Barak:
The judge must consider the degree of social consensus with social
values and the legal norms derived from them. It is desirable to
avoid choosing an option that sharply opposes the fundamental per-
ceptions of the public .. . .The reason for this approach lies in
democratic considerations, the considerations of separation of pow-
ers and the need to ensure public trust in the judicial system . . . .
A judge does not have to be the flag bearer of new social consensus-
es. He must give expression to fundamental values recognized in his
society rather than create them. 99
Justice Rubinstein referred to these citations and said that one
should examine these matters not only from the perspective of indi-
vidual justice, but also from the perspective of a broad common de-
nominator which extends as much as possible among the parts of a
divided Israeli society, while avoiding extremes. An issue regarding a
public symbol in Israel should justifiably be determined by the legis-
lature. The registration is an official approval of the state to create a
family unit, which is recognized by only a small minority of the coun-
tries in the world. 1 o Therefore, Justice Rubinstein suggests that the
petitions should be rejected.
It is important to mention that in December 2006, Justice Rubin-
stein wrote in his opinion that only 6 out of 192 states recognize
same-sex marriage, and therefore, the State of Israel should not lead
this trend. There is no doubt that following the Obergefell decisiono
this is no longer a strong argument.
95. HCJ 3045/05 Ari, at § 9 in Justice Rubinstein's opinion.
96. Indeed the religious parties in Israel are fighting for the leadership of the ministry in
charge of the Population Registry.
97. HCJ 3045/05 Ari, at § 16.
98. AllARON BARAK, JUI)ICIAL DISCRETION 289 (1987).
99. AtIARON BARAK, Ti lEJUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 47 (2004).
100. HCJ 3045/05 Ari v. Director of the Population Administration, at § 9 (Nov. 21,
2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
101. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). This Supreme Court decision set a
precedent in ruling that the Constitution of the United States requires allowing same-sex mar-
riage. Therefore, all fifty states within the United States are obligated to do so.
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D. Family Court 16310/08, Anonymous - Domestic Violence
In the last three decisions described above, as well as in those
mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court tried to avoid the ideological
discussion and therefore declared that its decisions do not recognize
same-sex marriage, but rather grant specific rights. There are few
judges in the lower courts that use this declaration to avoid recogni-
tion of same-sex couples in issues that haven't yet been decided by
the Supreme Court. An example is the following case referred to as
Anonymous.102
A petition was made in which one partner requested an order un-
der the Family Violence Prevention Laws of 1991 for the cessation of
harassment by his same-sex spouse.o The Family Court Justice
German wrote that, over the past decade, there has indeed been a
trend in the courts, by way of interpretation, to recognize same-sex
couples as spouses." However the interpretation was limited to spe-
cific needs. In this connection, the concepts of a "spouse" and "the
common law spouse" should be understood in plain human language,
just as these concepts are understood in all the laws that constitute
family law.'0o Thus, he determined that the Family Violence Preven-
tion Laws do not apply to homosexual couples and denied the re-
quest.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of recognition of same-sex couples received a boost
during the last two decades in Israel and all over the world. In the
State of Israel that separates religion and state, and where marriage is
governed exclusively by religion, it would not have been clearly ex-
pected to recognize same-sex couples that marry in contrast to all
recognized religions in Israel. Nevertheless, Israeli law, as interpreted
in the Supreme Court decisions, led to widespread recognition of the
rights of same-sex couples. This transition was reviewed in detail in
this article. The recognition is part of the development of Israeli civil
law rather than religious law. This civil law is designed to respond to
the dynamics of life and the personal distress of individual partners. It
102. FC 16310/08, Anonymous v. Anonymous (Apr. 16, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
103. Family Violence Prevention Law, 5751-1991, § 2, 1352 LSI 138 (1991) (Isr.).
104. FC 16310/08 Anonymous at § 4.1.
105. Id. at § 4.2.
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seems that there is room to justify providing economic and social
rights to those who have decided to join their lives together, even if
they are of the same sex. However, the Supreme Court went a little
further and also decided that the public sphere has to recognize
same-sex couples, who should be allowed to adopt children and to
register in the Israeli Population Registry as married couples.
In my opinion, the following is the right balance between the val-
ues of Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state. On the one hand, the
individual is granted the permission or right to live his private life,
with his sexual orientation, as he chooses and without discrimination.
He lives his life as he pleases and is entitled to all the economic rights
granted to heterosexual spouses. On the other hand, among the val-
ues of Israel "as a Jewish state" is the rejection of same-sex relation-
ships as creating a family unit that differs from what is viewed as the
natural family. The decision to change this status quo should be
made by the legislature, whose members are elected by the people as
their representatives. This is the essence of democracy, and this is
the essence of government by the people.
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